Background Despite progress in improving health outcomes in Afghanistan by contracting public health services through non-governmental organizations (NGOs), inequity in access persists between the poor and non-poor. This study examined the distributive effect of different contracting types on primary health services provision between the poor and non-poor in rural Afghanistan.
Introduction and Background
Poorer individuals are usually less healthy compared with the non-poor and in greater needs of health services (Gwatkin et al. 2003) . To achieve health equity goals from a social justice standpoint, it is important that publicly financed health facilities disproportionately benefit the poor (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 1993; Gwatkin 2005; O'Donnell et al. 2007 ). In most low-and middle-income countries (LMICs), huge investments have been channelled towards providing inputs for public provision of health services with the assumption that the poor would utilize these services (Shakarishvili et al. 2011) . However, studies have shown that despite these investments, there are many more barriers, such as lack of information on service availability, distance, user fees and other informal payments that preclude poor households from using publicly provided services (Ensor and Cooper 2004; Peters et al. 2008; Jacobs et al. 2011) , and in many cases it is the non-poor that capture the benefits of these services (Castro-Leal et al. 1999; Gwatkin et al. 2003; O'Donnell et al. 2007) .
Indeed, studies have shown that in most LMICs, the poor use facility-based services less when compared with those of other socioeconomic groups, and this situation contributes to the existing health inequity in these places (Castro-Leal et al. 1999; Mahal et al. 2001; Peters et al. 2002; O'Donnell et al. 2007) . Some have suggested that investment in community-based/ family-oriented services may be the key to reaching the poor and addressing inequities Knippenberg et al. 2005) , whereas others have suggested that the answer lies in effectively targeting benefits of publicly provided services to the poor (van de Walle 1998; Gwatkin 2005) . Contracting provision of facility-based services (hereafter referred to as contracting) to non-state providers to provide services exclusively to the poor or broadly in areas where the poor resides is one way of targeting the benefit of publicly financed health care to the poor (England 2004; Liu et al. 2004 Liu et al. , 2007 .
In Afghanistan and after the Taliban war, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and a semiautonomous agency (called Strengthening Mechanism or SM) within the health ministry were contracted to provide basic care to populations residing in mostly rural and hard to reach areas as part of efforts to rebuild the health system in the country and to rapidly scale up access to health services among disadvantaged populations (Strong et al. 2005; Waldman et al. 2006; Sabri et al. 2007) . The health services contracts in Afghanistan were both incomplete and relational, i.e. contracts with missing stipulations that often allow contracting parties some flexibility to adapt to specific situations needed for achieving the outcomes of the contract (MacNeil 1974 (MacNeil , 1978 Palmer 2000; Liu et al. 2004) . They were established in 2003 and associated with specific donors (Sondorp et al. 2009 ). They could be broadly classified into four different types based on the nature, design and implementation processes involved in the contractual arrangements (Strong et al. 2005; Waldman et al. 2006; Sabri et al. 2007; Arur et al. 2010) .
These classifications are Contracting in, CI (provision of health services was contracted to a semiautonomous agency within the health ministry; this agency is staffed by government employees; however, it operates like a private NGO with autonomy to tender proposal for and implement health services contract without being bound by the ministry's internal procedural regulations), and Contracting out, CO (provision of health services was contracted to private NGOs). The CO mechanism had three types: Type 1 or CO-1, Type 2 or CO-2, and Type 3 or CO-3. Whereas the contract budget is fixed under all CO types, it is negotiable under CO-1 but non-negotiable under CO-2 and CO-3; and while the deliverables/outputs are negotiable under CO-2, they are non-negotiable under CO-1. Contracts under CO-3 are input based. Performance bonuses are paid under both CO-1 and CI contracts and the performance bonuses were paid out based on performance indicators that include measures of utilization of services, perceived quality of care, clinical processes of care and equity measured by a third party (Strong et al. 2005) . Table 1 provides a complete description of each contracting type and other key distinguishing feature including differences in contract management and sources of drugs and supplies. Each contracting type covers public health facilities in an entire province or cluster of districts within a province, and these were allocated in a nonrandom fashion based largely on the pre-existing establishment of the major donor agencies in Afghanistan (Waldman et al. 2006; Siddiqi et al. 2006; Sabri et al. 2007 ). In addition, there were health facilities that continued to provide health services under no contractual arrangement as part of the Afghanistan public healthcare delivery system; these are referred to as noncontracting (Arur et al. 2010) .
Whereas previous studies have demonstrated that contracting in LMICs, including the different mechanisms employed in Afghanistan, have led to a significant increase in the number of poor people utilizing facility-based contracted services (Loevinsohn 2001; Liu et al. 2004; Arur et al. 2010) , it is yet Table 1 Characteristics of different contracting types in Afghanistan
Contracting in (CI)
Broad classification CO, government selects one or more private service providers through a competitive process to deliver specific services to a specific population CO, government selects one or more private service providers through a competitive process to deliver specific services to a specific population CO, government selects one or more private service providers through a competitive process to deliver specific services to a specific population CI, a semiautonomous agency within the government is contracted to deliver services to a specific population to be established if the poor disproportionately benefit more from these contracted services compared with the non-poor to demonstrate their effect on socioeconomic health inequities. Such knowledge is of policy significance for Afghanistan and other fragile and transition states, where health services delivery systems are mainly dependent on contracting, as they ponder pathways for achieving universal health coverage and eliminating socioeconomic health inequities. Understanding the impact of different contracting arrangements on health inequities will provide direction for policy makers in Afghanistan on which contracting mechanism to choose to achieve a primary goal of improving health equity in the short term and inform the design and implementation of health services contract in other LMICs. A previous study conducted in Afghanistan has established that contracting increases health services utilization rates by the poor (Arur et al. 2010) . However, the increased utilization may only reflect the overall increase in volume of services and not the closing of the inequity gap. This article assessed the effect of contracting on socioeconomic health inequities by examining if each of the different contracting types employed in Afghanistan made services being provided at primary healthcare facilities more pro-poor over time, between 2005 and 2008, compared with the non-contracted facilities. A health facility is considered pro-poor over time if the odds that more poor clients compared with nonpoor clients attend the facility between 2005 and 2008.
Contract scheme

Methods
Sample description
The data for this study were derived from the annual national health services performance assessment (NHSPA) health facility surveys conducted in Afghanistan in 2005 and 2008 . Although the contracts were established in 2003, implementation did not begin until 2004. By 2005, the baseline year used for this study, implementation was in an early phase. These surveys were implemented using multistage random sampling covering health facilities in the rural areas of 33 and 29 of the 34 Afghan provinces for years 2005 and 2008, respectively. The NHSPA surveys have been previously described in details by Peters et al. (2007) and Hansen et al. (2008) . From each sampled health facility, 10 new clients were systematically selected for exit interviews from the outpatient department (where both preventive and curative primary health services were provided) to collect information on their socioeconomic status, services utilization, satisfaction and perception of quality. In addition, each head of a health facility was asked to provide information on the health facility, including information on the NGO that is contracted to provide services at that facility. The final sample for this analysis was based on pooled information from 2949 and 2981 clients' exit interviews in 2005 and 2008, respectively, from 306 health facilities in 28 provinces of Afghanistan. Table 2 shows the breakdown of the study population (exit interviewees) by contracting types. The unit of analysis for this study is an individual attending a health facility and the outcome is aggregated by the contracting types/non-contracting mechanism at work in the health facility that the individual attended.
Each individual attending a health facility was classified as poor or non-poor based on wealth scores generated from weights on asset that the individual or household possessed (Filmer and Scott 2008) . The weights were generated using the Principal Component Analysis (Filmer and Scott 2008) conducted on assets from two national population surveys, the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) household surveys conducted in Afghanistan in (ICON-INSTITUTE 2009 ). These surveys are nationally representative and independent of the health facility-based exit interviews. Table 1 shows the list of the 14 household/asset variables and the standardized weights assigned to each variable based on the 2005 and 2008 NRVA surveys. Wealth scores were generated from the weights for each household in 2005 and 2008. Based on these wealth scores, national cut-offs were determined and the households were classified into wealth quintiles.
The standardized weights for the 2005 and 2008 NRVA surveys were pooled across the two periods for each variable. These fixed weights were later transported to the exit interviews to generate wealth scores for clients in the 2005 and 2008 NHSPA surveys based on their assets. The year-specific national cut-offs from the household surveys were then used to classify individuals in the exit interviews into wealth quintiles. The asset weights were fixed to provide comparability of the value assigned to assets over the two time periods and the yearspecifics cut-offs were retained to reflect the trend in the level of poverty over the two time periods. Individuals that were classified into the lowest two quintiles were defined as poor (lowest 40%), while those in the top three quintiles were defined as non-poor (upper 60%). The categorization was based on the most recent estimate of percentage of Afghans that were below the national poverty line which is 36% (ICON-INSTITUTE 2009). The main outcome was the odds of a client attending a health facility being classified as poor.
Data analysis
The initial exploratory data analyses included a description of each variable, trend analyses and test of independent variables for multicollinearity. The outcome, that is, the odds that a client seeking care at a health facility under a particular contracting type/non-contracting mechanism is poor was modelled using logistic regression. Because health facilities were not randomly assigned to the different contracting/non-contracting mechanisms, changes in the outcome for individuals exposed to different contracting/non-contracting mechanisms over time were compared using the difference-in-difference (DID) approach to minimize on potential selection bias and confounding. The final model combined the DID approach with stratified analyses comparing individuals exposed to each contracting type with the non-contracting in separate analyses to preserve the unique contextual arrangements under which each contracting type was implemented. A simplified version of the DID model is illustrated below:
where DID, treatment effect from the DID model, C, Contracting type under consideration; NC, non-contracting study group; T, time periods, 0 ¼ 2005 and 1 ¼ 2008 The outcome was implemented as the log odds that a client attending a health facility is poor. The treatment effects using the DID approach combined with stratified analyses were implemented as interaction terms (between the contracting/ non-contracting mechanism variable and time). In addition to the stratified analyses, a full model that combines all the data for the various contracting types as a single cross-section across the two time points was also implemented to show the association of each covariate with the outcome holding time constant. Finally, a multivariate linear regression model was implemented for the treatment effects to validate the direction and magnitude of the test statistics for the interaction terms.
The regression equation for the effect models is summarized below and Table 2 shows the interpretation of the regression coefficients:
where Y it , outcome variable for individual 'i' at time 't'; Con it , dummy variable coded 1 if the individual falls under a contracting type at either time 0 or time 1; Year, dummy variable for year coded 1 if the observation is from 2008 (time 1), coded 0 otherwise; Con it Ã Year, dummy variable coded '1' if the observation comes from a contracting type and belongs to time period 1; X i , vector of independent covariates and time variant factors included in the model; 3 , is the difference in differences in outcome comparing individuals attending a health facility under a contracting type to individuals attending non-contracted health facility while adjusting for the vector of independent covariates and time variant factors; 2 , the difference in the outcome comparing individuals attending a non-contracted health facility between 2008 and 2005 while adjusting for the vector of independent covariates and time variant factors; 2 þ 3 , the difference in the outcome comparing individuals attending a health facility under a contracting approach between 2008 and 2005 while adjusting for the vector of independent covariates and time variant factors. The DID estimation model assumed that all necessary time variant independent factors were included in the final model, that is no omitted variable bias, and there were enough subjects in each contracting/non-contracting groups to compensate for the problem of common errors which could likely occur because interaction terms were used to estimate the effect of a fixed variable such as contracting that does not vary with time (Mullainathan et al. 2004) . Because the unit of analysis (at the individual level) is more detailed than the level of variation for contracting/non-contracting mechanism at the health facility level, the cluster-correlated robust variance option was chosen under the assumption that there were no misspecifications in estimating the treatment effects (Wooldridge 2002; Freedman 2005) .
The independent variables included in the final model were client-specific variables such as age, gender, length of illness period, client's perception of quality (computed as an index consisting of 10 different items on satisfaction with different aspect of visit to the health facility, including the cost of care and skill of the attending health staff-see Table 3 for the list of variables included in the index). Health facility level variables included were: type of primary health facilities (which are Basic Health Center, BHC; Comprehensive Health Center, CHC; and District Hospital, DH); whether the contracted NGO was locally or foreign based; infrastructure index which captured the structural quality of the health facility (Table 4 shows a list of the 18 items included in computing the infrastructure index); user fees policy for curative services at the health facility categorized into three, that is facilities without user fees, facilities with user fees but with exemptions in place and facilities with user fees without exemption. Exemption from user fees was determined based on a waiver system that targets very poor and female headed households; eligibility for waiver was determined by local community leaders and facility staff and capped at 15% of the catchment household for the health facility (Steinhardt and Peters 2010) . As of April 2008, all facilities in Afghanistan were required to stop charging user fees and most had complied by the end of that year.
Other variables included were: if a facility Shura council was in place at the health facility (Shuras are community-based committees with oversight function on the operations of a health facility); if the health facility was pro-female defined as facilities with females constituting >50% of new outpatient visits, excluding obstetric-related cases, over a 6-month period before the surveys; type of healthcare provider; the number of Community Health Workers (CHWs) working with the health facility, these were categorized into three->10 CHWs, 1-10 CHWs and none. Given the high level of insecurity in some regions in Afghanistan, an additional independent variable that reflects the level of provincial insecurity in the area where the health facility is located was also included. The insecurity index was expressed as the number of fatalities among North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operating within a particular province in Afghanistan. None of the independent variables included in the study had more than 3% of missing values.
The logistic models were tested for goodness of fit using the Hosmer-Lemeshow test (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000) , influence of influential points on the regression coefficients using the Pregibon (1981) leverage, and for misspecification and omitted variable bias using the linktest option in Stata (Stata Consulting Group 2012). All analyses were completed in Stata 10 I/C statistical package.
Results
Data summaries and trends
The samples for the exit interviews were 2949 in 2005 and 2981 in 2008. The percentages of those that received services from CO-1, CO-2, CO-3 and CI facilities based on the pooled data from 2005 and 2008 were 17.3%, 36.6%, 28.3% and 11.6%, respectively. About 6.2% of respondents received services from non-contracted health facilities (Table 2) .
Between 2005 and 2008, the proportion of those surveyed for exit interview who were classified as poor decreased by 6% points (P < 0.001). Both measures of health services quality assessed-clients' perception of quality index and infrastructure index-increased between the two time points; by 1.06 (P < 0.001) and 1.91 (P < 0.001), respectively. Also, the proportion of those who received services at health facilities with >10 CHWs also increased by 42% points (P < 0.001) between the two time points. Table 3 shows the complete result of trends for all variables of interest comparing levels in 2008 to 2005.
DID model
The DID model based on the stratified analyses showed that the adjusted odds of a poor client attending a health facility increased significantly between 2005 and 2008 for health facilities under CO-1 and CO-2, with odds ratio of 2.82 (1.49, 5.36) P-value of 0.001 and 2.00 (1.33, 3.02) P-value of 0.001, respectively. The adjusted odds ratios of a poor client attending a health facility for facilities under CO-3 and CI were not statistically significant different over time. The DID estimates showed that the adjusted odds of a poor client attending a health facility over time, that is the adjusted odds that a health facility becomes pro-poor with time, was statistically significantly higher among those attending health facilities under the CO-1 compared with the non-contracting facilities with ratio of odds ratios of 2.45 (1.30, 4.61) and P-value of 0.005. For those attending health facilities under the other contracting types, there was no statistically significant change in the odds of poor client attendance compared with those attending the noncontracting facilities (Table 4) .
The p-value from the Linktest and Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit test were <0.001 and >0.05 for each of the comparisons between the different contracting types and the non-contracting respectively (Tables 5 and 6) suggesting that the models have a reasonable goodness of fit for the data
Cross-sectional model
The results for the full model that combines the data for the various contracting types/non-contracting mechanism across the two time points in Table 5 showed that increased client age, adjusted odds ratio of 1.01 (1.00, 1.01) P < 0.001; length of illness period of 3 weeks or more, adjusted odds ratio of 1.27 (1.07, 1.51) P-value 0.008; health facilities which exempts the poor from user fees compared with those with no user fees, adjusted odds ratio of 1.35 (1.06, 1.72) P-value 0.02; and health facilities having more than 10 CHWs compared with none, adjusted odds ratio of 1.35 (1.09, 1.68) P-value 0.006 were significantly associated with attracting more poor clients and making a health facility pro-poor. Conversely, factors such as infrastructure index, adjusted odds ratio of 0.90 (0.87, 0.94) P < 0.001; facilities being managed by foreign NGOs, adjusted odds ratio of 0.76 (0.67, 0.87) P < 0.001 were significantly associated with making a health facility less pro-poor. The odds ratio comparing BHCs to DHs was 0.59 (0.47, 0.73) P < 0.001 suggesting that the odds of BHCs being pro-poor compared with the DH were 1.70 times significantly higher. There was no statistical significant difference comparing BHCs to the CHCs.
Discussion
Contracting for health services has been previously shown to increase efficiency, coverage and utilization of the health delivery system, but its effect on health inequity is inconclusive (Palmer 2000; England 2004; Liu et al. 2004; Arur et al. 2010) . Evidence based on limited studies from other LMICs suggested that contracting-out (CO) approaches with appropriate incentives would improve the use of primary care services by the poor in relation to other approaches (Liu et al. 2004 (Liu et al. , 2007 . In Bangladesh (Loevinsohn 2002; Mahmud 2002) , Guatemala (Nieves and La Forgia 2000) and Cambodia (Loevinsohn 2001) , CO primary care was found to improve use of primary services at the health facilities by the poor. It is important to highlight that these prior studies focused primarily on the impact of contracting on the poor only and not on the inequity gap between the poor and non-poor. This study examined the inequity of primary health services (both preventive and curative use) between the poor and non-poor attending health facilities under different contracting types compared with those under the non-contracting approach between 2005 and 2008 in rural Afghanistan. Whereas the results suggest that health facilities under CO-1 and CO-2 were more pro-poor over time, the effect was only significant for facilities under CO-1 when compared with the non-contracting facilities. There was no evidence to support that CO-3 and CI had a pro-poor effect on health services provision in rural Afghanistan.
Some of the features that distinguish CO-1 from other contracting types (Table 1) include the fact that the contracts under CO-1 are competitive (unlike CI), i.e. all potential contractors go through a bidding process and successful candidates are selected based on certain financial and technical criteria; and the fixed lump-sum budget under this approach are completely negotiable (unlike CO-2 and CO-3), i.e. contractors can decide (with the approval of the contract manager) to switch allocation of money from one service area to another, as need arises, so far as they do not exceed the budgeted amount and such changes are justifiable for achieving the contract deliverables, which are not negotiable (unlike CO-2). These features, coupled with the fact that the health services contracts are incomplete, could have provided reasonable latitude for contractors under CO-1 to seek less perceptible pathways to achieve the contracting goals, including improving health inequities. Indeed, some authors including Mills (1998) , Liu et al. (2004) and England (2004) have suggested that how health contracts are implemented may be important in determining a given outcome especially where those contracts are incomplete and relational (Palmer 2000) . Others have suggested that enabling guided local decisions on monetary allocation could improve performance of health services delivery systems since decision makers at this level have a better sense of the local context and more open to feedback from end-users of services (Azfar et al. 2004 ).
There is evidence to suggest that service providers under CO-1 may have employed innovative strategies to attract the poor given the latitude allowed in their contracting arrangements. The results from this study showed that having more than 10 CHWs working with a health facility compared with none significantly increases the odds of making a health facility more pro-poor in Afghanistan (Table 5 ). In fact, this was the only covariate that was found to be significantly associated with the increased odds of a poor client attending a health facility of all the covariates tested in each of the stratified analyses (Table 7) . Interestingly, health facilities under CO-1 had the highest proportion of facilities with over 10 active CHWs compared with other contracting and non-contracting approaches.
The activities of CHWs in Afghanistan have been previously demonstrated to be critical for extending services to indigent populations in extremely hard-to-reach areas (Viswanathan et al. 2011) and have been demonstrated to be important for increasing access to other basic services, especially maternal and child health services (Kidane and Morrow 2000; Sazawal and Black 2003; Bang et al. 2005; Winch et al. 2005) , primary health care services (Greenwood et al. 1990 ) and interventions requiring periodic outreaches (San Sebastian et al. 2001 ) in other settings. According to the Community-Based Care Model under which these CHWs were recruited in Afghanistan (MoPH 2005), they were to serve as critical linkages between the health facilities and their local communities and provide both preventive and curative primary care services in hard-to-reach areas while encouraging prompt referrals for complicated cases and mobilizing the local communities to use the available health services (MoPH 2005) . Studies from other LMICs have suggested that community-based care is essential in improving health outcomes especially among the poor who lack access to facility-based care Haines et al. 2007) and studies on community participation have shown that CHWs are likely to be more effective in mobilizing the poor and other disadvantaged group to use health services when they are actively linked to the health facilities (Rosato et al. 2008; Talukder and Rob 2010) .
Unlike the other CO types, contracts under CO-1 also provide performance bonus to the contracted NGOs and their frontline health workers in addition to specified monetary commitments that are stipulated in the contracts (Strong et al. 2005; Sabri et al. 2007 ) and this might serve as further incentives for the healthcare providers to fulfill their contractual obligations (Deci 1972; Soeters and Griffiths 2003) . The performance bonus are paid based on a number of indicators that make up the Afghanistan health sector balanced scorecard (Hansen et al. 2008 ) and one of these indicators measures the equity of service use at a health facility between the poor and non-poor using the concentration indices thus providing a direct link between the performance bonus and the drive to achieve propoor use of the health facility services by NGOs under CO-1. A performance bonus is also provided to the semiautonomous government agency (SM) implementing the CI. However, it is less apparent if the performance bonus reaches the frontline health workers under the CI approach. The fact that the CO-1 approach is completely independent of the contract manager, Grants Contract Management Unit (GCMU), at the health ministry compared with the CI (Table 1) , which is implemented by an agency whose employee are still under the health ministry, may have enhanced accountability with respect to the management of the performance bonus under CO-1.
Whereas health facilities under the CO-2 approach attracted more poor people over time, this effect was not significant when compared with facilities under the non-contracting approach. The distinguishing features of CO-2 which could explain this temporal pro-poor effect include strong supportive supervision and an arrangement where free essential drugs and supplies are directly provided to the health facilities by the contract manager, an international NGO (Table 1) . However, these may not be sufficient to significantly increase the volume of the poor clients relative to the non-poor compared with the non-contracting approach.
Previous studies conducted in Afghanistan using health facility based data between 2004 and 2005 found that the absolute count of the poor (measured as utilization rates based on health facility records) using the health facility services increased dramatically between the two time periods for all the different contracting types compared with the non-contracting (Arur et al. 2010) . However, they also found that the CI approach outperformed the CO approach (CO-1, CO-2 and CO-3 combined) with respect to service utilization by the poor. It is important to note that the utilization rates computed by Arur et al. (2010) were based on the records of the absolute number of poor (without any comparison to the number of non-poor) per 1000 of the coverage population. The outcome for this study however compared the volume of the poor to the non-poor for the same population of clients at the health facility level and provided evidence to suggest that increasingly more poor compared with the non-poor were utilizing services being provided under CO-1 after adjusting for time. Moreover, the two studies covered different time periods which further makes a comparison of results to be difficult. The effects of other supply-side factors, apart from the number of CHWs, tested on the odds of a health facility becoming pro-poor were inconsistent when compared in the different stratified analyses (except for the type of health facility)- Table 7 . This may suggest that the context in which the contracted services were implemented may have significant effect in modifying the effects of these supply-side factors (Victora et al. 2005) . The odds of a health facility being pro-poor suggest that BHCs compared with DH are significantly more pro-poor. This perhaps is because these BHCs are situated in more remote areas where mostly the poor reside or the DH are located in district centers with relatively less poor population.
Whereas the length of illness period of 3 weeks or more and age of the client were associated with the odds that a poor client attends a health facility for care for all the contracting approaches compared with non-contracting, other demand-side factors such as the perception of quality of care showed inconsistent results in the stratified analyses. Previous studies from Afghanistan (Steinhardt et al. 2009 ), Nigeria (Onwujekwe and Uzochukwu 2004) and Kenya (Chuma et al. 2007) have shown that there is a relationship between chronic illness, care seeking and poverty. The incidence of chronic illnesses increases with age (Bodenheimer et al. 2009; Denton and Spencer 2010) ; chronic illnesses predispose to medically related poverty and increase the likelihood of using publicly provided services (Whitehead et al. 2001) . Publicly provided services are less costly in most cases; hence, they are more financially accessible to the poor (McIntyre 1990) . It is not surprising therefore to find that the poor who are older and likely to seek curative care for more long-standing illnesses are attracted to the contracted services. This however does not represent the complete picture of adult care-seeking pattern and behaviour in Afghanistan. Indeed, $70% of all adults in the country typically obtain curative care from the private and informal health sector (USAID 2008) .
It is important to point out that the trend analysis showed that both the structural quality of health facilities and the perception of quality of service delivery at these health facilities improved significantly in Afghanistan between 2005 and 2008. These findings are consistent with findings from prior studies in Afghanistan which showed that the index of structural and process quality increased significantly with the advent of the contracting approaches (Arur 2008; Gupta 2008) .
Whereas the study recognizes the need to adjust for insecurity given the Afghanistan context, it acknowledges the limitation of using ISAF fatalities as a measure of insecurity. Although ISAF members were present in 29 of the 34 Afghan provinces during the period under observation, fatalities of service members may not adequately predict the insecurity related to care seeking among the population. Whereas the study made an attempt to mitigate the influence of confounding that may occur due to lack of randomization of health facilities to contracting types by using the DID technique, this technique would only yield unbiased estimate under the assumption that all the possible time varying independent factors have been included in the estimation model. Hence, the study estimates are susceptible to omitted variable bias. Despite the fact that repeated measures were not taken exactly of the same study unit across time, i.e. the composition of interviewees at the different surveys may have changed over the time points, the dataset was constructed as longitudinal data under the assumption that the outcome for all subjects are identical and independently distributed (iid) to allow us make an inference that is generalizable. This inference would however be biased if the iid assumption was false.
Conclusion
CO-1, contracting out strategy implemented through a competitive bidding process and which allows contractors some latitude in deciding how funds are allocated within fixed lump sum budgets with explicit and inviolable deliverables, and actively managed through an independent government agency, is effective in reducing the inequity gap of facility-based services utilization between the poor and non-poor in Afghanistan. The provision of performance bonuses tied to specific equity targets under such CO strategy may play additional role in reducing the inequity gap. Demand-side factors which influence the likelihood of care seeking by the poor include age and length of illness of 3 weeks or more suggesting that poor individuals who are older and suffer from chronic illnesses are more likely to attend the donorfinanced health facilities. Smaller health facility such as the BHCs are more pro-poor compared with the other facility types, including DHs perhaps because they are situated in relatively harder-to-reach areas where the poor reside. Contracting for health services will continue to play a significant role in the way public health services delivery is organized in Afghanistan for some time in the near future. From a health equity standpoint, the findings of this study provide policy evidence and justification for the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to harmonize all contracting approaches in the country under the CO-1, as is currently in process. It also highlights important elements within the CO approaches that should be retained in future if the harmonized approach were to be modified. The findings from this study can inform the design and implementation of health services contracts in other transition and fragile states such as South Sudan and countries in the process of rebuilding their health systems such as Liberia and Haiti where contracting for health services remains a mainstay approach for health services delivery. The study findings also have policy implications for countries with stable health systems that are exploring complementary approaches, including contracting for health services, in achieving universal coverage of health services and eliminating health inequities.
